Abstract: This paper examines the possible impacts of rapid aging and population decline on Japan's immigration policies. It is commonly understood that Japanese governments have shown a considerably restrictive attitude toward the acceptance of foreigners. In fact, immigrants and even foreign workers were not officially accepted in Japan unless they were highly skilled professionals. At the same time, recent initiatives such as the Economic Partnership Agreement about foreign health care workers from Indonesia and the Philippines, the third-country refugee program, and the point system for highly skilled foreign workers have shown a previously unseen dynamic in the respective policy fields. Similarly, a larger number of policy recommendations have called for changes of the current system and the official recognition of immigration. Do these developments signal a turn in Japanese immigration policies?
Introduction
When in 2008 the Japanese population started to shrink, this marked a demographic turning point in recent Japanese history that has been widely dis-Junichi Akashi cussed. The society's rapid aging and the concomitant decline of the workingage population pose great problems to the social security system, including medical care and pensions. Worries that the very basis of the Japanese economy will collapse are getting more pronounced with each year the development continues. And there is no doubt that it is going to continue for quite some time.
According to calculations by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan's present population of approx. 128 million people will drop below 100 million by 2028 and below 90 million by 2060 (IPSS 2012) . Broadly speaking, the population will shrink about the same extent that it used to grow since after the Pacific War, but there will be a totally different age structure. Whereas 50 years ago the share of elderly people (65 years or older) was around 7 %, it is expected to rise to 40 % within the next 50 years. Likewise, only 10 years ago, one older person was supported by 3.56 persons from the working-age population (15 to 64 years). This ratio will be down to 2.56 in 10 years, and drop to 1.3 in 50 years from now, if developments continue as predicted (Cabinet Office 2013) . No matter what projections are consulted, there is no doubt that population decline in Japan is unescapable.
While the social implications of this development have come to be analyzed from various perspectives (e.g., Fujimasa and Furukawa 2000; Matsutani and Fujimasa 2002; Matsutani 2004; Hiroi 2013) , it is certainly no coincidence that the issue of migration has also become a topic of increased public attention (Akashi 2009 ). As the more recent discussions differ from the debates about foreigners held during the bubble and post-bubble years in the 1980s and 1990s, this calls for a reconsideration of what I will refer to as Japanese "immigration policies." 1 In fact, recent years have seen a couple of noteworthy initiatives in the respective policy fields: In 2006, new "Guidelines about permanent residence" (Eijū kyoka ni kan suru gaidorain) were issued; in 2006 and 2007 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) were ratified that provided for the acceptance of foreign nurses and care workers; in 2010 Japan was the first Asian country to 1 The term "immigration policies" (imin seisaku) as used in this paper refers to policies designed to regulate the specifics and general orientation regarding the acceptance of foreigners. This includes government decisions about the immigration system and the legal conditions of foreign workers in Japan. Even though the term is not commonly used as a technical term in Japanese law and administration, it will be shown that in recent years various policies presupposing a long-term residential system for foreigners have been developed. Moreover, considering that more than half of Japan's registered foreign residents hold a permanent or long-term status, the term "immigration policies" appears feasible to refer to policies in the respective fields. enact a program for refugees resident in third countries; and in 2012 a point system for highly skilled foreign workers was introduced. In addition, as will be shown in Section 4, various policy recommendations have been made that call for a quicker acceptance of immigrants.
From these developments the following questions arise: Are these political developments a reflection of the macro changes in the social structure? And if so, will this bring about a reform of the immigration policies by a self-declared non-immigrant country that has made much of its ethnic and linguistic homogeneity? In other words, will Japan's immigration policies finally change from a closed-door to an open-door system? Such change would mean breaking away from the basic assumption that foreigners in Japan are but temporary guests. Instead, the legal system would need to be revised in a way that reflects their acknowledgment as full members of the Japanese society.
In order to answer these questions, this paper explores the most recent series of political activities and policy recommendations. Section 2 reviews the previous literature on foreign workers and situates the current approach against this backdrop. Section 3 takes three recent initiatives directly related to the issue of immigration and works out their purpose, their systemic properties, and their effects so far. In addition, the political actors will be located. In a second step, recent policy recommendations and subsequent discussions regarding the acceptance of immigrants will be examined in Section 4.
Data used for this paper include government and other administrative documents, Diet records, and a larger number of secondary sources. In addition, I took part in various political discussions and other events related to the topic.
Previous research on immigration policies regarding foreign workers
While earlier discussions about the acceptance of foreigners in Japan have been extensively studied (see Mori 2002; Nakagawa 2003) , research exploring the political background to the topic has been rather scarce. 2 What is generally agreed upon in this research is that Japanese immigration policies have been extremely restrictive.
If we look at the bare figures only, Japan's foreign population of about 2 million registered foreign residents makes up less than 2 % of the total population. In comparison with other developed countries -which, to be sure, have developed in different historical contexts -Japan is still seeing itself as an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous society. This has evoked criticism that an economic power like Japan should not -and will not be able tomaintain its traditional closed-door immigration policies.
As I have claimed in an earlier paper (Akashi 2010) , this has been the predominant view in Japanese immigration policy research. At the same time, the policies themselves have been taken as a given and the processes during which they developed have been only poorly studied. Instead, the main focus has been on the social consequences of immigration to Japan. This is not to say that research on the policies themselves does not exist. Table 1 gives a list of publications that deal with the topic in the context of foreign workers in Japan. For reasons of space, it summarizes only those aspects that are relevant for the present discussion. 
Reference
Main focus of analysis Main variables/framework Kajita (1994) Acceptance of foreign workers National labor market National identity European experiences Koike (1996) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy subsystems Ministry of Labour Advocacy coalition framework Bartram (2000 Bartram ( , 2005 Policies regarding foreign workers Strong bureaucracy Kuwahara (2002) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy networks Trainee system 1989 Revision of Immigration Law Akashi (2006 Akashi ( , 2009 Fujii (2007) Policies regarding foreign workers Security issues Labor-management cooperation Hamaguchi (2010) Policies regarding foreign workers Sectionalism Ministry of Labour Hosono (2011) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy subsystems EPA Advocacy coalition framework Policies regarding foreign workers Welfare regime Policy networks
For example, Koike (1996) uses an advocacy coalition framework to examine the political circumstances that led to the introduction of the trainee system (ginō jisshū seido) in the first half of the 1990s and the role of the Ministry of Labour. 3 Using a similar theoretical approach, Hosono (2011) analyzes the policy formation processes behind the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that regulates the acceptance of nursing and caregiving professionals from the Philippines (see next section). Kuwahara (2002) applies policy network theory to explore the policies designed to regulate the influx of foreign workers in the second half of the 1980s. works out the theoretical implications of foreign workers with respect to the welfare system. Not subscribing to a specific theoretical frame, Akashi (2006) conducted interviews with various stakeholders to study the political dynamics that shaped the 1989 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and the acceptance of nikkeijin and foreign trainees.
As can be seen, there is a large variety of theories, research frames, and variables in recent immigration policy research in Japan. The spectrum reaches from studies with a strong theoretical focus to more empirical approaches like that of Hamaguchi (2010) . While all these studies are methodologically sound and contribute to the general theory of political processes, there are various limitations.
First of all, each of these studies deals with only one single aspect of immigration policies. While this brings to light the stakeholders' interests for a specific issue, it does not sufficiently work out the overall characteristics of Japanese immigration policies in a broader sense.
Secondly, and leaving aside some more recent research on the nursing and caring EPA, most previous studies concentrate on the 1980s and 1990s. As the next section will show, the rather dramatic developments of the present and the very recent past, including the shrinking of the Japanese population, have not yet received sufficient attention. This also applies to studies like Kajita (1994) , Bartram (2000 Bartram ( , 2005 , and Fujii (2007) , which emphasize the historical factors that shaped Japanese immigration policies.
A third limitation of previous research is the reliance on a specific theoretical model or concept such as policy network theory, sectionalism, or the advocacy coalition framework. Also, there is a general tendency to focus on the leading role of the bureaucracy. In other words, it is the ministries and agencies that are perceived to have the largest impact on immigration policies.
Previous research thus is not necessarily feasible if we are to examine the impact of Japan's recent population decline on Japanese immigration policies.
As the acceptance of immigrants is a topic that can be much easier politicized than the earlier initiatives with regard to foreign workers, such policies cannot likely be determined by the respective government agencies alone. Being a topic with great future implications for the host society, the choice for or against immigration is increasingly becoming subject to politicians' values and assessments. For a better understanding of immigration policies in population-declining Japan, it is thus essential to not pre-assume a dominating role of the political bureaucracy.
The analysis in this paper attempts to take a more comprehensive approach that includes various policy domains and political actors. This approach will also enable us to re-evaluate the validity of previous concepts and theories and hopefully contribute to a better theoretical understanding of Japanese immigration policies as a whole.
Recent policy developments and their implications
The last couple of years have seen some very dynamic developments in Japanese immigration policy. The main issues have been summarized in Table 2 .
To start with, in 2006 the Ministry of Justice issued the Guidelines about the Permission for Permanent Residence. Two years later, the aforementioned nursing and caring EPAs with Indonesia and the Philippines (and later Vietnam) began, and have since been widely discussed in the relevant literature (Yamasaki 2006; Asato 2007; Yamamoto 2009 ). In 2010, Japan joined the UN's third-country resettlement initiative and started a pilot program of taking in refugees. While Japan has regularly been criticized by NGOs and other organizations for its closed-door attitude toward refugees, the cabinet decision to join the program was hailed by some as a possible turning point in Japanese refugee policies (e.g., Ishikawa 2011). 2012 then saw the introduction of the PointsBased System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals. Persons accepted to the system under certain conditions will be able to bring parents or maids, and may apply for permanent residence after only five years of stay in Japan. 4 Though different in orientation, the policies described above either facilitate residence in Japan or take it as a precondition. But can this be seen as a turning point in Japanese immigration policies from a closed-door to an opendoor system? As my analysis will show, this question cannot be answered in the affirmative. To support this claim, we will have a look at the following aspects for each of these policies: (i) purpose, (ii) system, and (iii) effects.
Starting with the 2006 guidelines about permanent residence, their purpose was already announced in earlier government initiatives toward regulatory reform, but this did not contribute to changing the system in a way as to alleviate the conditions for permanent residence themselves. Thus in effect, the guide-lines did not have an influence on the number of permanent residence permissions. 5 The purpose of the nursing and caring EPA was mainly foreign-policy based. Domestically, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has continued to take a negative view on the employment of foreign nurses and care workers and has refused to acknowledge their recruitment as a solution to labor shortages in the health sector. Suggestions by private organizations were reacted to in a similarly negative way. If foreign workers were to be accepted at all, so the Ministry's stance, this should be done under very strict conditions only.
One organization that is frequently mentioned as a stern opponent of any alleviation of the conditions for immigration is the Japanese Nursing Association (Nihon kango kyōkai) and its political arm, the Japan Nursing Federation (Nihon kango renmei). It is well known that these two organizations have strong links to the Nursing Division of the MHLW's Health Policy Bureau (Kōsei rōdō-shō iseikyoku kangoka). This mechanism helps to strengthen the network between public and private organs in Japan's nursing care business.
In addition, the influence of politicians who take the above organizations as their power bases must not be ignored. Thus trained nurse and former Minister of Justice Chieko Nohno stipulated that all foreigners who want to work in the domestic nursing care business must have just the same skills and qualifications as their Japanese colleagues, which also includes passing the national nursing exam. 6 Two current politicians representing the interests of the nursing business are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) representatives Toshiko Abe, former deputy director of the Japanese Nursing Association, and Emiko Takagai, who is the present executive director of the organization. The frequently quoted iron triangle that links politicians, the state bureaucracy, and the business sector is very alive here.
Two peculiarities about the system are the upper limit of possible applicants and the requirement to pass the national nursing exam within the given time frame. As a result, in the past five years less than 2,000 foreign nursing care professionals have applied for the two programs, of which so far less than 300 eventually passed the test. The purpose of the third-country refugee program is somewhat obscure. Briefly before the Japanese government in 2007 started discussing the framework, the High Commissioner of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), António Guterres, visited Japan and talked with his predecessor, Sadako Ogata. 7 It may well be possible that the main intention to join the program was to sweep away criticism about Japan being a closed country for refugees.
However that may be, the project faced only minor political opposition and was supported by all parliamentary factions, which shows there was some substantial political backup. From the point of view of the system, however, it must be kept in mind that this is merely a pilot program that provides for an annual maximum of 30 persons. In fact, in 2012 not a single refugee came to Japan under the program, and the total of accepted persons so far is still below 70. This shows that, similar to the EPA scheme, the effect of the respective policies is minimal.
As for the 2012 point system for highly skilled foreign professionals, preparations had already been started ten years earlier. A Cabinet meeting in June 2002 adopted structural reform principles that explicitly included the promotion of a "brain gain" (zunō ryūnyū) and an enhanced employment of "highly skilled overseas human resources" (kaigai no kōdo jinzai). This has been supported by the business sector from the start, without any sizable opposition from labor circles.
Yet there are also critical views on the laxer conditions for permanent residence, the possibility to invite family members, and an expansion of the system in general (see Gotō 2013; MOFA 2011) . And even though the 2010 Fourth Immigration Control Master Plan by the Ministry of Justice mentions the purpose to "actively promote immigration policies" (MOJ 2010: 2), the hurdles for an applicant to be admitted are actually quite high. One consequence is that the effective number of people who came to Japan under the program so far has remained below 2,000 in total, which was the target number set by the government for the first year only. Like with the EPA scheme and the third-country refugee program, the point system thus remains faced with a number of institutional constraints.
In sum, the systemic properties of the recent policy measures suggest that it is still a long way to an open-door policy. Also, the discussions accompanying the introduction of these measures have centered on the however slight opening of the door itself, but have not seriously considered the integration of foreigners as full members of the Japanese society. In effect, immigration so far has failed to have any sizable impact on the labor market or the population development.
Ironically, this has invited a series of fragmentary revisions and amendments of the policies. In the case of the EPA scheme, for instance, the maximum period of stay has been extended and some modifications have been made to make the nursing exam questions more easily understandable for non-Japanese test takers. Kanji have been supplemented by Furigana, the names of diseases are now given in both Japanese and English, and easier Japanese expressions are used. In addition, the test taking time has been extended (MHLW 2012). Likewise, the third-country refugee program was extended for two more years and various steps were taken to broaden the pool of possible candidates (Cabinet Secretariat 2012a). Comparable initiatives had to be implemented with regard to the low number of successful applicants of the point system for skilled foreign workers (see MOJ 2013a (see MOJ , 2013b ).
All in all, then, we can summarize as follows: As the recent plans and programs do acknowledge permanent residence under specified conditions, they may well be called a breakthrough in Japan's hitherto closed-door policies. On the other hand, it cannot be said that there is any evidence for a real turning point in these developments. 8
Recent policy suggestions and the government's (non-)reaction
The previous section has discussed the major developments in Japanese immigration policies. As could be seen, it is a fact that a number of systemic changes have been implemented in the last couple of years. It is difficult, however, to perceive of these changes as a real reform of Japanese immigration policies that would entail the acceptance of foreigners as full members of the society. This can be confirmed when looking at the series of recent policy recommendations about immigration and how they failed to be included in actual policy making. Table 3 summarizes the major proposals and requests regarding structural changes of the Japanese immigration system and the acceptance of foreign workers.
8 Incidentally, the same can be said of the new registration system provided by the 2009 Amendment of the Immigration and Refugee Recognition Act. Though under the new system foreign residents are included in the communities' basic resident register (jūmin kihon daichō), the ultimate purpose of this policy is to build up a database on foreign nationals in Japan (see also Akashi 2012 Akashi , 2013 . -consider restricted number of foreign (Keidanren 2007) workers to secure human resources 2 6/2008 LDP, Division of National Strategy: -1 0 million immigrants (ca. 10 % of "Opening the country to human the total population) resources! Proposal for a Japa--large-scale structural reforms of the nese-style immigration policy" legal system (LDP 2008a) 3 7/2008 LDP, Division of National Strategy: -short-term admittance of foreign work-"Recommendations for the estabers without restrictions on occupalishment of a system for shorttion/business type term foreign workers" (LDP 2008b) -determine upper limit for each year -maximum period of stay 3 years 4 7/2008
Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and -make up for the shrinking workingIndustry: "Opinion on the accepage population by increasing immigratance of foreign workers and the tion revision of the trainee and techni--desirable to grant permanent resical intern program" (TCCI 2008) dence under given conditions 5 9/2008 Japan Economic Research Insti--softening of employment permits and tute: "Issues and directions about better development of foreign capacithe acceptance of foreign workties ers" (Nikkeichō 2008) -revision of current status of residence categories and introduction of a "specially skilled person" (tokutei ginō jinzai) category 6 10/2008 Japan Business Federation: "Out--increase acceptance of skilled foreign line of an economic system feasiworkers in specific fields to sustain ble to deal with population dethe economic system cline" (Keidanren 2008) 7 6/2009/ Japan Immigration Policy Institute: -necessary transformation of Japan 9/2009 "The concept of Japanese-style iminto an immigration country through migration policy" (JIPI 2009) bringing in foreign nationals in a large number -educational measures to avoid frictions with host society 8 5/2010
Council on Population Education: -introduction of Japanese-style immi-"Seven proposals for Japan to regration policies and quick opening of establish its place as a respected the country to human resources (jinmember of the international comzai kaikaku) munity" (Jinkō mondai kyōgikai -permanent residence 2010) -education and training in Japan, incl. Japanese language Junichi Akashi Kansai Association of Corporate -revision of immigration law to deal Executives: "Revitalizing Japan with labor shortages in farming, forthrough the promotion of permaestry, and fishery nent foreign residents" (Kansai -public supports targeted at settled Keizai Doyukai 2013) migrants -foundation of a "foreigners' office" (gaikokujinchō) -raise budget for relevant projects
As previously described, the recent emergence of these discussions must be seen in the context of growing anxieties about population decline, which has been given much public attention particularly since 2008, the year the Japanese population factually started to shrink. Even before that there had been reasons to worry though. There was the labor shortage during the bubble years in the late 1980s, and the economic recession of the 1990s, which also saw the peak and subsequent decline of the working-age population. Less than ten years on, the decline of the total population and the pessimistic prospects this will entail for the Japanese economy started to become the main issue. The series of policy suggestions by business leaders and think tanks throughout the last couple of years must be seen in direct relationship to these demographic facts. They question not only the existing immigration system but, on a deeper level, the acceptance of foreigners in Japanese society as such.
However, as remarked in the previous section, Japanese governments and their bureaucracies have been rather unresponsive to such public interjections. One likely reason for this, as frequently mentioned in the literature, is the difficulty of consensus building. Research on present and past immigration policies -the integration of nikkeijin from South America, the foreign trainee program around the 1990s, as well as more recent initiatives like the care worker EPA scheme -has identified a lack of consensus between the political actors and pronounced sectionalism between the government agencies (Akashi 2006 (Akashi , 2010 Vogt 2007) . Even if opposition doesn't necessarily show at the surface, it can be assumed that consensus building between the political actors will be further complicated when it comes to the procurement of foreign labor.
One indication for such lack of consent can be found in the differing views expressed in the policy recommendations themselves. Thus the examples in Table 3 are far from uniform in their orientation and at times show quite fundamental differences. For instance, while suggestions such as #2, #7, and #8 advocate permanent residence as a solution to the demographic problems, #1, #3, #5, #6, and #9 recommend only temporary acceptance of foreign workers.
These gaps can be found even within the parties. One of the recommendations that advocate permanent residence is the 2008 "Opening the country to human resources!" plan (#2). It was developed by the LPD's Division of National Strategy, represented by the party's heavyweight, former secretary general and cabinet secretary Hidenao Nakagawa (Akashi and Ogawa 2008; Sakanaka 2011; Roberts 2012) . Also from the LDP, and almost around the same time, came the "Recommendations for the introduction of a system for short-term foreign workers" (#3), which, as can already be understood from the title, takes an entirely different view on the issue.
Of the two reports, the former was given higher media attention, though the most likely reason for this is that this rather bold scheme was presented by a representative of the ruling party's main faction, rather than the fact that it was considered particularly realistic. In retrospect, neither the former nor the latter plan seems to have had any noticeable impact on actual policy making so far.
As can be seen in Table 3 , the "Opening the country to human resources!" (#2) plan proposes a total number of no less than 10 million immigrants in Japan by 2050. This figure was clearly inspired by suggestions from the Japan Immigration Policy Institute (JIPI), which was founded by Hidenori Sakanaka, a former bureaucrat of the Ministry of Justice (see #7). Having attended various meetings of the aforementioned LDP Division of National Strategy at which Sakanaka was present, too, my general impression was that even within this group little consensus building seemed to be undertaken. Opinions considerably differed about the number of 10 million immigrants (for details, see Akashi and Ogawa 2008) , and there was even reluctance to use the term imin [immigrants/immigration] itself, though Sakanaka's original plan finally came to be accepted.
Noteworthy is that the awareness to avoid the term imin did not seem to change much when the LDP after three years was re-elected into government in December 2012. Their former Alliance of Diet Members to Promote the Ex-change of Foreign Human Resources (Gaikoku jinzai kōryū giin renmei) was subsequently renamed into Alliance of Diet Members for International Human Resources (Kokusai jinzai giin renmei). The newly appointed representative of the group is Yuriko Koike, former head of the LDP's public relations section. She was reported saying that while seeing the necessity of admitting foreign workers, she would prefer the term "international human resources" (kokusai jinzai) over "foreign human resources" (gaikoku jinzai). She also mentioned that the term imin was prone to provoke fierce opposition (Arima 2013) .
While usage of the term imin has increased in debates of the Diet, the current government is clearly not in favor of immigration. A reform of immigration policies is not a major issue in Abenomics, the current prime minister's program of pro-growth economic policies. Although the Abe administration, anticipating a labor shortage in the construction industry for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and other key sectors, recently announced to consider the expansion of the current temporary migrant workers scheme, their main answers to the country's shrinking working-age population are the promotion of female workforce participation, increasing birthrates, greater labor market flexibility, and the employment of senior citizens, among others. And even though it is expected that a facilitation of the procedures for short-stay business meetings will be raised as a topic in the current TPP negotiations, it is highly unlikely that immigration or the issue of the so-called "unskilled workers" (tanjun rōdōsha) will be dealt with. To be sure, some progress has been made in specific fields, such as the IT sector, where a mutual acknowledgment of qualifications with other countries has been promoted. However, even here the national exams remain a major obstacle in many professions. In other words, both with respect to Abenomics and the TPP negotiations, there is no indication of a reform of the system toward an open-door policy.
On 23 May 2013, MP Katsuhiko Eguchi of Your Party mentioned the term "immigration policies" (imin seisaku) during a meeting of the House of Councilors' Committee on the topic of regional reorganization. Anticipating opposition due to anxieties about regional autonomy with regard to immigration, he asked Prime Minster Abe for a clarification on this point. While this constituted one of very rare occasions for an incumbent Japanese prime minister to talk about immigration policies at all, Abe's reply was rather non-committal in stating that this was an issue that related to the very "foundation of the state" (kokka no konkan) and that the government would "take a proactive role in deciding" (shutaiteki ni kimete iku) on this issue.
A few days in advance of this event, the topic had already been dealt with at the Lower House Judicial Affairs Committee. On 10 May 2013, Tsuyoshi Shiina, also member of Your Party at the time, made an inquiry about the afore-mentioned LDP recommendations for large-scale immigration that had been issued by its Division of National Strategy (#2) and demanded clarification by the government. Minister of Justice Sadakazu Tanigaki replied by pointing out that there was not the necessary consensus on the part of the society and also raised the issue of public safety in this context. Therefore, the government would continue its cautious approach to the topic.
Indeed, the lack of consensus by the population and the issue of public safety appear to be two of the main bricks in the logic of the government's playing-it-safe approach. With regard to the former, public opinion polls by the government itself address this topic merely by asking about foreign workers (gaikokujin rōdōsha). According to the most recent survey from 2004, 26 % completely reject unskilled foreign workers, while 39 % accept their admission on condition that labor shortages could not be made up for even with women and elderly citizens being recruited, and 17 % accept their admission without conditions (Cabinet Office 2004) . These figures suggest that more than half of the population considers foreign workers to be at least an option. The government does not normally refer to these data. 9 Data about crimes by foreigners are annually published by the National Police Agency. 10 According to these statistics, the number of cases involving foreigners peaked in 2005, while the number of arrested persons was highest in 2004. Both numbers dropped subsequently, which is also reflected in opinion polls about public safety. Whereas in 2006, 55 % of the respondents saw foreign crime as the main reason for the worsening of public safety, less than 30 % expressed this view in 2012 (Cabinet Office 2006 .
As can be seen, both the argument about missing public consent and the concern about public safety lack clear empirical evidence. Nevertheless they continue to be given as the two main reasons for the government's reservations about immigration. Japanese governments have done their best to strengthen the overall impression that the Japanese population has a "reclusive" (heisateki) view on foreigners and, at the same time, not make the topic of immigration as such a political issue.
And this trend is observable not only for the long post-war rule of the LDP. For example, in the early 2000s, a group of young Diet members consisting of Motohisa Furukawa, Takeaki Matsumoto, and Goshi Hosono of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), officially advocated a future number of 10 million immi-9 Possible differences in public opinion with regard to different groups or specifications of foreigners such as migrants (imin), refugees (nanmin), foreign workers (gaikokujin rōdōsha), etc., remain a topic for future research. 10 See http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm#kokusaihanzai (accessed 28 March 2014). grants. But although all three of them were to hold important positions during the subsequent three years of DPJ rule -Furukawa became Minister of State for Special Missions, Matsumoto Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hosono DPJ Secretary General, among others -no concrete policy making on the topic of migration was ever undertaken. This shows that even politicians who express a positive stance toward immigration policy reform revoke their former statements once they hold a position in state affairs.
To give another example, under DPJ rule in 2012, the Cabinet Secretariat set up a Review Conference on the Implementation of Coexistence with Foreigners (Gaikokujin to no kyōsei jitsugen kentō kaigi). 11 It was led by Masaharu Nakagawa, then Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and a well-known proponent of an open-door immigration policy. But even though one major aim of the conference was to stimulate discussion about immigration in a broader sense, it merely resulted in a confirmation of previously declared intentions to improve the conditions for foreigners already resident in Japan (Cabinet Secretariat 2012b). Nakagawa's more progressive view on the issue was clearly not reflected here. When I had the chance to bring up this point during a lecture I gave to DPJ Diet members in February 2012, I was told that a certain segment of the public expressed strong opposition toward Nakagawa's previous statements on the issue. Within the DPJ, too, there are many skeptics, rendering consensus building a very difficult endeavor.
The critical position of the DPJ can also be understood from a discussion at the House of Councilors' Committee on Judicial Affairs on 22 March 2012. Here, LDP Diet member Kazuya Maruyama stated the necessity to accept foreign immigrants in order to deal with Japan's demographic ailments. He then confronted Toshio Ogawa, who was the DPJ's Minister of Justice at the time, with this question, about which he said he had so far received no clear answer from the minister. Ogawa's reply was a mere replication of common positions, holding that countermeasures to the falling birthrate should be given priority and that consensus by the people was important.
Even though LDP's Maruyama expressed such a positive stance toward the topic, many of his own party members take an entirely different view on the issue. This can be seen from a discussion at the House of Representatives' Committee on the Cabinet that took place on 7 March 2012. During the discussion LDP Diet member Seiko Noda confronted aforementioned Nakagawa as incumbent Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology with his previous statements about a desirable increase of immigration to Japan. She expressed great astonishment about the minister's point of view on the topic and called for a clear statement that "the Japanese come first" (mazu saisho ni Nihonjin ariki) (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2012) . Obviously, this is in great contrast to fellow LDP member Maruyama's position, showing that opinions strongly differ within the LDP, too. By the way, the above mentioned Review Conference on the Implementation of Coexistence with Foreigners of the Cabinet Secretariat was suspended when the LDP retook government.
In summary, we can say that even though the DPJ came to power around the same time that Japan's population started to shrink, immigration failed to become a major political issue under their rule, and nothing much has changed since the LDP took over in 2012. Both in government and in opposition the two parties have done little consensus building and have continued to show a very cautious attitude on the topic. Particularly when in government, strong efforts tend to be undertaken to keep immigration a political non-issue.
Among the many likely reasons for the government's reluctance to deal with the topic is that a substantial increase in immigration would also bring up the issue of the immigrants' most frequent countries of origin. For example, when the previously mentioned LDP Division of National Strategy in 2008 presented their plan about 10 million immigrants, right-wing groups organized protest rallies with banners reading "Save Japan from the China-people invasion" (Shinajin no jinkō shinryaku kara Nihon o mamore). Moreover, LDP's Hidenori Sakanaka himself, who as previously mentioned was largely in charge of promoting the plan, more recently suggested that care would have to be taken in finding the right balance with regard to the ethnic makeup of immigrants (Sakanaka 2013) . It can be assumed that the trouble-ridden relationship with China and Korea will remain a major obstacle in future discussions on immigration (see also Akashi 2010) .
Leaving aside the discussions in mostly anonymous Internet forums, open opposition against immigration at present is restricted to a handful of conservative intellectuals and revisionist political groups. Nevertheless, it rarely happens that politicians, let alone those with official functions, mention the problems of ethnicity and their possible implications for foreign relations that may result from larger-scale immigration. Particularly government officials have gone out of their way to not discuss these issues in public. These attitudes will most likely help retain the political silence that has been a main characteristic of Japanese immigration policies past and present.
Junichi Akashi

Conclusion
This paper has started with the question of whether the recent phenomenon of population decline has brought about a turning point in Japanese immigration policies. In fact, recent years have seen lively political activities on the topic, as also testified to by a larger number of policy recommendations. This being said, however, a closer analysis of the background and the effects of these developments reveals that Japan has not substantially deviated from its traditional closed-door policies. The issue of immigration as such has not been spelled out as a prior political topic, and so far no thorough discussion has taken place. One reason for this is lacking consensus building on the part of the main political actors.
The negative stance toward immigration on the part of the government has traditionally been explained by sectionalism and opposition of the government bureaucracies. How then are we to interpret the recent situation, with its numerous policy plans and recommendations that bring in the issue of immigration as one way to deal with the country's demographic predicaments?
The analysis has shown that differing interests between and even within the parties have impeded a consolidation of opinions. Particularly the government has been most eager to avoid making immigration a political issue. Rather than fundamental reform, the status quo has been left largely unchanged, some small-scale revisions notwithstanding. Difficulties in consensus building, both in the bureaucracy and the political parties, are one of the main reasons for this.
As could be seen in Section 3, recent initiatives like the EPA scheme, the third-country refugee program, and the point system for highly skilled foreign workers, all have suffered from rather strict requirements with regard to their upper limits and other specifications. As a result, they have had relatively minor effects in reality, and subsequent improvements have been mostly cosmetic. A systematic approach with clear goals and principles is not identifiable.
Even faced with the prospects of large-scale population aging and decrease, Japanese governments have continued to adhere to past principles and shunned away from initiating any serious debate on the topic. What we do see is a number of time-lagged, incremental reactions that may well result in peripheral, local changes of the legal system, but they are not likely to bring about any fundamental changes to the basically negative stance on immigration as a whole. Of course it should not be ruled out of hand that the recent flood of political activities and recommendations in fact indicates an upcoming turning point. Even if this were the case, however, we will need to closely examine the political reactions to the growing socioeconomic pressures of Ja-pan's demographic developments and what real impacts they will have on future immigration policy making.
